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SUMMARY 
The ports are the main node in the supply chain and freight transportation. The terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001 marked a turning point in global security. Following this 
event, and from then on, there is a widespread fear of an attack on commercial ports. The 
development of the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code of the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO), and the implementation of the measures 
derived from it, have significantly improved security at port facilities. However, the 
experience in recent decades indicates the need for adjustments in the security assessment, 
in order to improve risk assessment, which is sometimes either underestimated or 
overestimated. As a first result of the investigation, new parameters for assessing security 
are proposed considering new aspects on the basis of an analysis of the main 
methodologies specific to port facilities, the analysis of surveys of the responsible 
managers for the security of the Spanish port system, and the analysis of the security 
statistics obtained through security forces. 
1. INTRODUCTION
Since 2003, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the International Labour 
Organization (ILO) have defined a methodology for port facilities risk assessment, have 
developed methodologies directly applicable to quantify risk and, based on the results, 
proposed various measures to mitigate the risk. However, the specific methodologies for 
the assessment of port security are still few and generally are formulated theoretically, but 
not based on real conceptual or theoretical insights. The purpose of this study is to define a 
new methodology for assessing the risk based on real data and information obtained 
directly from the Port System, that allows to determine those aspects not considered so far 
in the security analysis in port facilities to terrorist acts, sabotage, theft, etc., not being 
considered here the losses due to technical problems associated with the installation, etc.. 
In order to identify new parameters reflecting unpublished aspects, a comparison between 
the selected methodologies for ports and further surveys, and revision of existing statistics 
of crime in ports has been carried out. Subsequently, by applying a panel of experts, the 
proposed parameters have been validated.  
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The investigation began with a review of the state of the art on risk analysis in 
infrastructures, describing the existence of several methodologies, but only those that are 
meant to evaluate any type of infrastructure and to consider the risks of any kind or acts 
specifically terrorism, sabotage, etc., were selected. Thus, a total of 16 different 
methodologies for risk assessment in critical infrastructure, including ports, were selected 
and analyzed. Once collected and analyzed, a few methodologies were selected that met 
the following criteria: 
1. Specifically targeted on security assessment of terrorist acts, sabotage, intrusion, 
etc. 
2. Specifically developed for application on port/harbours facilities. Those that 
focused on specific risks cited in port infrastructure or related to these were 
considered. This is the case of airport facilities due to large organizational and 
functional similarities with ports. 
Based on these criteria the following methodologies were retained for its comparative 
analysis: 
1. CIVIL AVIATION (COLOMBIA). This is the International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO) methodology for aviation security applied in Colombia 
airports and other three countries in the region. Colombia is a country with serious 
security problems due to the existence of terrorist groups for decades and therefore 
it is of interest to consider.  
2. CARVER (US Army). This methodology has been already used especially in risk 
assessments in port environments of the American continent which goodness has 
been largely proven, having been used also as the base for the development of other 
methodologies such as SECUREPORT (Spain).  
3. RBDM. Navigation and Vessel Inspection. US Coast Guard. This is the 
methodology used for the risk assessment in the USA ports and it is highly 
followed because its application comes out of the borders of the USA, having been 
introduced in most of the American countries due to the commercial relations with 
the USA. 
4. SECUREPORT. Ports of the State (Spain). The Spanish methodology, was 
developed by Ports of the State specifically for this sector, being approved and put 
into practice in 2004. 
5. THREAT AND RISK ANALYSIS MATRIX (TRAM). International Labour 
Organization (ILO) and International Maritime Organization (IMO). This 
methodology was originally proposed by IMO and, therefore, it is the basic 
reference for the study and risk assessment in ports all over the world. 
 
2.1 Comparative analysis 
Methodologies are qualitatively analyzed in order to obtain more information about the 
features, detail the scope, format of the outcome of the risk assessment, scope of the 
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evaluation, etc. To carry out such a comparative analysis, the following issues are 
discussed: 
• Risk assessment method employed: does it use the classic formula? 
• Way the risk assessment is done, is it qualitative or quantitative? 
• Simplicity and ease of application 
• Does it consider the probability of the event? 
• Types of attacks considered, are they specified? What type? 
• Accurate identification of vulnerabilities with different rates for each specific parameter 
of vulnerability 
• Is the vulnerability analysis broken down by parameters or is there a global analysis, 
instead? 
• Scheme for determining the consequences, specifically or globally valued?  
The assessment made between the different methodologies selected is summarized below: 
• CIVIL AVIATION (Colombia): it assesses the risk by a preliminary analysis of the 
capabilities of the infrastructure to repel an attack, based on historical events. It does not 
perform a detailed analysis of the threat based on a formulation, but it does study - for each 
threat – the different aspects and as a result a probability of occurrence is assigned. It also 
assesses the consequences only in terms of loss of operation of the installation. 
• CARVER (USA): it identifies very well the vulnerabilities of a given facility so that the 
measures to take can be fit in detail. It is designed to evaluate the possible targets of attack, 
giving it an interesting objectivity to the result from the viewpoint of definition of possible 
attacks. It does allow neither the assessment of direct consequences on targets or 
population, which is a major disadvantage, nor the assessment of the probabilities of 
occurrence. 
• RBDM (Risk Based Decision Making). Navigation and Vessel Inspection Service (US 
Coast Guard) is an easy-to-use methodology and it is designed specifically for evaluating 
risks in ports, also considering risks included in the scope of this research. The 
consequences are pre-established according to the type of traffic and terminals and - as in 
the above described case – it does not consider the consequences of loss of life. Besides, 
the consequences are neither evaluated nor specified (not measurable). The vulnerabilities 
are measured on the basis of accessibility and security, in three levels. 
• SECUREPORT (Spain): it is a comprehensive methodology that includes multiple 
parameters and sub-parameters that makes it - to the security assessors - neat and 
unattractive for its application. It focuses primarily on three types of attacks and considered 
the probability of the event. Accessibility and security are assessed only qualitatively, 
without defining general acceptable characteristics to these. 
• TRAM (IMO-ILO): This method is simple to use and considers the same risks as the 
subject of this research. It considers the probability of occurrence of the event, but the 
assessment of the vulnerabilities and consequences is very general, without detailing 
specific aspects to value.  
Once the comparison between the different methodologies selected is done, a preliminary 
comparison between the parameters that are defined in each of them is performed, 
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evaluating them from the perspective of the classical formulation of risk assessment: 
Risk = Threat x Vulnerability x Consequences 
In order to evaluate them, they are reviewed and analyzed with the following criteria: 
• Description of parameters 
• Scope of the parameter; similarities and differences 
• Relationship between qualitative parameters 
For the compliance of the targets defined in this section, a matrix which relates the 
methodologies to be studied and the parameters that each of them considers in the 
evaluation of the risks has been created. In that matrix, the parameters used for every 
methodology are indicated in the rows along with the parameters of other methodologies 
that could be considered to be homologous or comparable in content and target, in order to 
analyze them later in a joint way. When the matrix is analyzed, it becomes obvious the 
existence of a number of parameters that - on a general way - are repeated in almost all of 
the formulations; parameters of probability, vulnerability and consequences, and the 
second group of parameters derived from the previous ones that, therefore, have the same 
meaning or assignment (Table 1). 
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Table 1 – Parameters Matrix 
 
Below, as a summary, those parameters identified which define different aspects from the 
classics are described. These are: 
• Redundancy elements: it rates quantitatively the possibility that the port facility being 
analyzed may continue working without the goods affected by the event that is considered. 
• Criticality-symbolic character: it values the increased probability of occurrence of an 
event in relation to the general level due to the symbolic nature of the system or analyzed 
component that could make it become a preferred target of attack. 
• Recoverability: it rates quantitatively the required period of time to recover the port 
facility to fully functional and operational capabilities (same as before the attack), provided 
that recovery is possible. 
• Recognizable objectives: It tries to assess the degree to which an object can be 
recognized without confusion with other objects or elements. The easily recognizable goals 
always better serve the purposes of a terrorist.  
In short, it is possible to say that all the considered methodologies are structured on the 
same basis of assessment in all indices, although there are nuances in the range offered by 
each methodology’s parameters, except for the CARVER methodology, which does not 
evaluate or assign the event probability or study the consequences of this. 
 
2.2 Surveys 
Once the parameters defined in the reference methodologies were analyzed, the detection 
of gaps or aspects not covered by those methodologies has been undertaken. With that 
goal, a survey was made to several port terminals of the Spanish Port System in order to 
obtain their type of threats, their frequency of occurrence and the security level to be 
considered in the assessment of risk in the facilities. The main objective of the surveys is to 
provide the study with a better reality-based knowledge of the existing lack of definitions 
in port risk assessment that nowadays are operating and which have been evaluated 
previously with other methodologies. The procedure implemented is described below: 
1. Definition of case studies for the Spanish Port System. The following types of terminal 
were considered to be evaluated: Solid Bulk, Liquid Bulk (oil, LNG, etc.), General Goods, 
Containers, and Cruise Passengers A questionnaire was set out according to the type of 
terminal in order to gather the relevant information to be used in the study. 
CIT2016 – XII Congreso de Ingeniería del Transporte 
València, Universitat Politècnica de València, 2016. 
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.4995/CIT2016.2016.3181 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).
   .  
 
 
2. Survey development to the responsible of terminals’ security. The surveys were sent to 
25 public and private terminals of the Spanish Port System. The following conclusions 
were achieved:  
 In general, larger threat risks do exist for goods than for they do for persons.  
 The intrusion risk differs from port to port, playing a key role the location of the port 
along the Spanish coastline - major threat frequency in the ports located in the south 
coast which are nearer to the Maghreb (Africa). 
 The potential of threats depends on the type of goods moved by the terminal. The 
terminals that present major risk are, according to the survey, Passenger terminals 
followed by Liquid Bulk terminals.  
 The lay-out of the facilities inside the terminal has a direct impact on the possibilities 
of having an attack. 
 
2.3 Security statistics analysis 
Later statistics on incidents against the security registered by the Coastal and Border 
Service of the Directorate General of the Guardia Civil (DGGC) responsible for security in 
the Spanish commercial ports were evaluated. Security Bulletins of the 46 commercial 
ports of Spain (28 Port Authorities), with data of two years were reviewed. From its 
analysis the following relevant information is deduced to the study by type of threat: 
• Illegal immigration. The breach of security is mentioned due to numerous interceptions 
of irregular migrants in merchant ships in various ports of southern Spain as ports of origin 
and as a destination port in the north of Spain or Europe. 
• Stowaways and intrusion on the premises (theft ...).  It proved feasible the access to the 
facilities of some ports and even ships, and therefore there are clear risk of detection of 
intrusion problems despite the access to terminals has been improved. 
• Sabotage. There are a reduced number of them, but there have been several cases in some 
ports. Physical or electronic sabotage of the systems themselves was considered, or of the 
communications control centers, or of the security forces in the port. All these are 
violations that showed the greatest weakness of the systems, while by themselves they 
constitute a situation of risk prior to the completion of criminal acts. 
• Terrorism. Although to date there have been few, there have been several attacks by the 
terrorist Basque group ETA, particularly in the same Port during July 2009. This 
highlighted the shortcomings and lack of effectiveness of the security controls in shipments 
of passengers and vehicles in some Spanish ports and the lack of security controls at 
landing at the destination. Also, several interviews were made with experts in security, and 
the following conclusions were obtained: 
 Lack of homogeneous criteria with regards to the capacity of dissuasion of the access 
to the terminals. This implies the need to better define the accessibility levels to be able 
to consider more objectively the threats, which at present are underestimated. 
 Need to improve the security (accessibility) in the pre-loading at the passengers' 
terminals where many potential threats do exist. 
 The security of a facility is determined by its proximity to other terminals of larger 
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potential risk and that may pose a threat for that facility. 
 The geographical location and proximity to “hot spots” of a port increases clearly the 




As a result of the development of the surveys, the analysis of the security statistics, and 
with the development of an expert panel, it was verified the existence of some aspects of 
the risk not being considered till now. It is deduced from the analysis that questions such as 
the specific evaluation of the risk (that can be linked to the type of terminal), or the implicit 
risk of a port according to its location on the coast, must be gathered in different 
parameters that may be combined in a formulation of risk assessment together with the 
consequences. 
The different factors to be considered and its transposition to parameters are described: 
 Port (IP). This parameter is intended to value the general risk against the security, 
named “intrinsic risk of the port”, that is the threat level for every port measured/value 
based on its physical location along the Spanish coast. The location of the port impacts 
perceptibly the level of general security facing possible threats.  
 Terminal (IT). This parameter is intended to consider the “intrinsic risk of the type of 
terminal”, that is the threat level which is linked or defined for every type of terminal. 
It becomes clear that the risk can be linked, from a point of view of the probability of 
occurrence of an event of a threat, to each type of terminal according to the kind of 
facilities that it has and the activity that it develops. Therefore, different threat levels 
are defined for every type of terminal: container, passenger, liquid bulk, solid bulk, etc. 
based on the particular characteristics of the type of goods and on the characteristics of 
design of every typology of terminal. 
 Accessibility (Iac). This parameter is re-defined, since it already existed, although now 
it is intended to assess the vulnerability of the facilities based on different physical and 
operative aspects, taking into account the degree of roadway or railway access that 
would facilitate the access to the terrorist (the easier accessibility the larger risk). Also, 
other aspects are considered such as: the type of closing of the facility, the control of 
access systems and the control of vehicles, the technology used (motion sensors, 
CCTV, radars, scanner, video analysis, etc.). 
 Layout (ILo). The influence of the layout in the security of a terminal is verified 
especially for what concerns the adjacent facilities, since it might be possible to access 
to a target by crossing an adjacent facility or even being impacted by a foreign attack. 
This parameter is valued according to the proximity of the terminal to the port access 
Also, the location of terminals with regards to liquid bulk terminals is considered due 
to the fact that the effect of an attack with explosives or shots to the liquid bulk 
terminal might reach other terminals in the vicinity.  
 Operative relevance (IRo). This parameter values the importance that certain facilities 
or elements have for port operation such as structures, railroad facilities, stores, etc. 
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and that can suffer the effects of a terrorist attack, rendering useless an important part 
of the terminal, with the resulting consequences. 
As noted, the proposed parameters constitute a significant improvement in the risk 
assessment as it is been done nowadays, adjusting their value and therefore their 
importance to more realistic values, which will undoubtedly improve planning security and 




Based on the study carried out and the information gathered, the main conclusions are 
presented: in spite of the implementation of security plans for 10 years, vulnerabilities not 
considered do exist. Therefore, their analysis needs to be adjusted on a continuous basis. 
Nowadays, the risk assessment does not fit to reality in many cases, overestimating its 
negative evaluation or - on the contrary – underestimating as limited risks those that are 
not. The geographical location of the port on the shoreline can be determinant for what 
concerns to the existence of a threat. The key to prevent most of the threats is the 
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